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TORTS-NON-DELEGABLE DUTY-AUTOMOBILE OWNER IS
LIABLE UNDER A NON-DELEGABLE DUTY FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF
AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR WHO FAILED TO MAINTAIN HER
BRAKES IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE VEHICLE CODE. Maloney v.
Rath (Cal. 1968).
On December 27, 1962, Mrs. Rath turned her car into a left
turn lane behind the car of the plaintiff. When she stepped on her
brake pedal, the brakes failed to function, and she struck the
rear end of the plaintiff's automobile causing injuries to plaintiff
and damage to her car. Prior to the collision, the brakes had
been functioning properly, and Mrs. Rath neither knew nor had
reason to know of their impending failure which was due to their
negligent installation by her independent contractor.' The
Superior Court denied plaintiff's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. On appeal to the Supreme Court of
California, held, reversed: Mrs. Rath is liable under a non-
delegable duty for the harm caused by the independent
contractor's2 negligent installation of the brakes. Maloney v.
Rath, 69 Adv. Cal. 455, 445 P.2d 513, 71 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1968).
Under early common law, an employer was not liable for
the harm caused by his independent contractor The rationale
for this rule was that the employer has no control over the
actions of the contractor, and therefore should not be liable for
the harm that he causes.4 However, this rule has been gradually
I. Approximately three months before the accident defendant hired Peter Evanchik
of Pete's Chevron Service to completely overhaul the brakes. Two weeks before the
accident defendant's car had been involved in another collision and it was repaired and
inspected although no repairs were made to the brakes. A rupture of the brake's
hydraulic hose caused by rubbing against the automobile's right front wheel produced the
brake failure. Maloney v. Rath, 69 Adv. Cal. 455, 457, 445 P.2d 513, 514, 71 Cal. Rptr.
897, 898 (1968).
2. The distinction between a servant and an independent contractor is based on
whether the employer has retained the right to control the details of the work. In
determining whether an individual is an independent contractor or a servant, the courts
generally consider the length of employment, degree of skill involved, where the work is
done, method of payment, extent of control the master may exercise by the terms of the
agreement, whether the employee is paid by the time or by the job, whether the employee
is engaged in a distinct occupation or business and whether by local custom the job is
usually done under the employer's supervision. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 220(2) (1958). Since Mrs. Rath is vicariously liable for the tort of her
independent contractor, she has a right of indemnity against Pete's Chevron Service. W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 48 at 279 (3d ed. 1964).
3. Laugher v. Pointer, 5 B. & C. 547, 108 Eng. Rep. 204 (1826): RSTATI NIFXT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 409, comment b (1965).
4. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 70 (3d ed. 1964).
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altered, and many exceptions are now recognized.5 The
justification for these exceptions is based on the grounds that the
employer is primarily benefited by the work, selects the
contractor, and may employ one who is financially responsible.6
These exceptions are generally divided into three categories, and
are determined by: (1) the employer's failure to exercise
reasonable care in selecting, instructing or supervising the
contractor;7 (2) a particular relationship of the employer to the
public imposed on the basis of statute, charter, franchise,
contract or common law;" (3) activities of the employer's
contractor which are specially, peculiarly, or inherently
dangerous. The Maloney court held that improperly maintained
automobile brakes fall within the second and third categories, as
they violate express statutory provisions'" present a serious risk
of bodily harm," and are highly dangerous. 2 Since many duties
created by statute are regarded as non-delegable because of the
highly dangerous nature of the activity, 3 these categories are
somewhat overlapping.
In support of its finding of a statutory non-delegable duty to
maintain brakes, the Maloney court cited Restatement of Torts
(2nd) section 424 which provides that:
One who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a
duty to provide specified safeguards or precautions for the
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. The employer will be held liable for his independent contractor's negligence if he
hires a contractor whom the employer should have known to be incompetent for the job.
RESTATEMENT (SECoND) of TORTS § 411 (1965). He is also liable for failure to exercise
supervision over parts of a contract which he has not delegated to anyone else or which
he has assumed to perform. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413 (1965);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 410, 412,414, 415 (1965).
8. Under common law, an employer may not delegate his landowner's duty of care
to keep premises safe for invitees. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 422 (1965). For
a collection of cases dealing with non-delegable duties imposed on the basis of statute,
charter, contract, franchise or common law, see 44 CAL. L. REv. at 763 n. 14 (1956).
9. The employer is held to a non-delegable duty where the activity is highly
dangerous unless special precautions are taken. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 423
(1965); see cases cited in notes 30 and 31 infra.
10. 69 Adv. Cal. at 457, 445 P.2d at 514, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 898. See notes 15-17
infra.
II. Id. at 461, 445 P.2d at 516, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
12. Id.
13. Snyder v. Southern California Edison Co., 44 Cal. 2d 793, 285 P.2d 558 (1948),
where a duty imposed by statute involved considerable risk unless properly executed.
1969)
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safety of others is subject to liability to the others for whose
protection the duty is imposed for harm caused by the failure
of a contractor employed by him to provide such safeguards
or precautions.'4
Since the brakes on Mrs. Rath's car were improperly
maintained, she violated California Vehicle Code sections
26300,15 2643516 and 26454.Y7 The court's position was that
Restatement section 424 sustains imposition of a non-delegable
duty under these statutes. Recent California decisions dealing
with the violations of these vehicle code sections do not, however,
support the imposition of a non-delegable duty. In Alarid v.
Vanier,8 which the Malone)" court cited in recognizing that Mrs.
Rath was not strictly liable, 9 the defendant violated the vehicle
code by failing to maintain adequate brakes;- this violation
raised a rebuttable presumption of negligence.2 Alarid made no
express determination with respect to the delegability of de-
fendant's duty. However, since the court emphasized the reason-
able care of the defendant in (1) not having reason to suspect
that the brakes were faulty, and (2) having the brakes recently
inspected prior to the accident as factors which would rebut the
presumption of negligence,22 it is reasonable to conclude that it
would have found the duty to be delegable.
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 424 (1965).
15. 69 Adv. Cal. at 457, 445 P.2d at 514, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 989. CAL. 'VEHICLE
CODE § 26300 (West 1960) provides: "Every motor vehicle, other than a motorcycle,
shall be equipped with brakes adequate to control the movement of the vehicle and to
stop and hold the vehicle."
16. CAL. 'VEHICLE CODE § 26453 provides: " All brakes and component parts
thereof shall be maintained in good condition and in good working order."
17. Id. at § 26454 provides that all automobiles designed to carry not more than
nine persons shall be capable of stopping from a speed of twenty miles an hour within 25
feet after the brakes are applied.
18. 50 Cal. 2d 617, 327 P.2d 897 (1958).
19. 69 Adv. Cal. at 458, 445 P.2d at 514, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 898; in Alarid, the
defendant stepped on his brake pedal but it did not function due to a failure of the brakes
and defendant collided with the rear end of plaintiff's car. A few weeks before the
collision a garage worked on his clutch but did not inform defendant that there was
anything wrong with his brakes. Immediately before the collision, defendant's brakes
were working satisfactorily and defendant had no reason to know of their impending
failure. 50 Cal. 2d at 620-21, 327 P.2d at 898.
20. The Alarid court held that defendant violated CAL. 'VEHICLE CODE § 670 (Vest
1935) which at that time provided: "No person shall operate on any highway any motor
vehicle . . . unless such motor vehicle . . . is equipped with brakes adequate to bring such
motor vehicle. . . to a complete stop. ... 50 Cal. 2d at 621, 327 P.2d at 898.
21. 50 Cal. 2d at 621, 327 P.2d at 898.
22. Id. at 624-25, 327 P.2d at 900.
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The Maloney court indicated that there is "language in
Ponce v. Black2 3 suggesting the duty is at least in part non-
delegable. ' 24 The Ponce court recognized that brake failure raises
a presumption of negligence 5 and developed five guidelines to
determine whether the presumption had been rebutted. The
defendant must show (1) the cause of the malfunction; (2) that
nothing had happened to impute knowledge of the defective
brakes to him; (3) that nothing in the prior performance of the
car known to him or attributed to him had contributed to the
malfunction; (4) that the automobile was inspected and
maintenance performed within a reasonable time before the
accident; and (5) that the cause of the malfunction could not
have been disclosed by a reasonable inspection within a
reasonable time prior to the collision or had occurred after the
inspection. The first four guidelines are aimed at the reasonable
care of the defendant. Arguably, the fifth guideline might be
interpreted to suggest that not only the defendant, but also the
independent contractor must be unable to discover the defect 7
However, since the Ponce court does not indicate whether an
independent contractor was involved in the case,28 this ambiguity
renders such an interpretation dubious authority to support the
contention that defendant's duty is non-delegable.
In finding a non-delegable duty based on the highly
dangerous nature of the activity, the Maloney court cited
Restatement of Torts (2nd) section 423 which states that:
One who carries on an activity which threatens a grave risk of
serious harm or death unless the instrumentalities used are
carefully constructed and maintained, and who employs an
independent contractor to construct or maintain such
23. 224 Cal. App. 2d 159, 36 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1964).
24. 69 Adv. Cal. at 459, 445 P.2d at 515, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
25. 224 Cal. App. 2d at 163, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 421.
26. Id.
27. Mrs. Rath argued that the fifth guideline referred only to the employer and that
she "was not capable of making an examination and discovering the faulty installation
made by Pete's Chevron Service." Brief for Respondant at 11, Maloney v. Rath, 69
Adv. Cal. 455, 445 P.2d 513, 71 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1968).
28. Since Justice Traynor in Maloney questions whether the court in Ponce
addressed itself to the issue of non-delegability, the significance of citing Ponce in his
decision is not apparent. The court may have believed that the five guidelines in sum
indicate a trend toward placing a heavy burden of proof on the defendant in order to
rebut the presumption of negligence which may be tantamount to establishing a non-
delegable duty.
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instrumentalities, is subject to the same liability for physical
harm caused by the negligence of the contractor in
constructing or maintaining such instrumentalities as though
the employer had himself done the work of construction or
maintenance. '
The cases supported by this section involve a peculiar risk of
bodily harm to others unless special precautions are taken as in
loading highly dangerous propane gas'" and spraying poisonous
solution for killing weeds .3  Because repair of automobile brakes
does not require special precautions, a faultily equipped
automobile does not fall within section 423 even though it does
represent a grave risk of serious bodily harm or death. 2
The Maloney court did cite numerous California decisions
which have imposed a non-delegable duty upon the employer to
protect severed parcels from damage,33 to maintain streets,3 to
keep land in a reasonably safe condition 5 and to guard open
fires 6 However, since the automobile owner does not have a
special relationship to the public, decisions imposing
non-delegable duties upon government agencies and landowners
because of such a relationship are not precedent to support the
contention that the duty to maintain automobile brakes is non-
delegable.
It appears that neither California decisions, the California
Vehicle Code nor the Restatement of Torts supports the
imposition of a non-delegable duty upon Mrs. Rath. The
decision, however, represents a predictable extension of the scope
of non-delegable duties and will facilitate the growing need of
providing compensation.37  Since many California automobile
29. RESTATEIENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 423 (1965).
30. Community Gas Co. v. Williams, 87 Ga. App. 68, 73 S.E.2d 119 (1952).
31. Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 221 S.C. 477, 71 S.E.2d 299 (1952).
32. 69 Adv. Cal. at 461, 445 P.2d at 516, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
33. Id. at 460, 415 P.2d at 516, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 900: Los Angeles Countq Hood
Control District v. Southern California Building and Land Association. 188 Cal. App. 2d
850, 10 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1961).
34. 69 Adv. Cal. at 460, 445 P.2d at 516, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 900: Van Arsdale v.
Hollinger, 68 Cal. 2d 245, 437 P.2d 508, 66 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1968).
35. 69 Adv. Cal. at 460, 445 P.2d at 516, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 900; Knell v. Morris, 39
Cal. 2d 450, 247 P.2d 352 (1952).
36. 69 Adv. Cal. at 460, 445 P.2d at 516. 71 Cal. Rptr. at 900; Courtell v. McEachen,
51 Cal. 2d 448, 334 P.2d 870 (1959).
37. In 1967, there were 53,100 death, 1,900,000 injuries which caused disability
beyond the day of the accident and costs of S10,700,000,000 because of motor vehicle
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owners have liability insurance,3 8 the Maloney court has imposed
this non-delegable duty as a means of distributing the costs of
automobile accidents throughout society in the form of liability
insurance. While defendant will incur a small increase in
insurance premiums,39 compared to the many thousands of
dollars of recovery made available to the victim, it seems socially
desirable to allow compensation.
The immediate impact of the Maloney decision may be seen
in Clark v. Dziabas.0 The plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Clark, were
injured when their automobile was struck by a car driven by the
defendant. As in Maloney, the collision was caused by a failure
of the defendant's brakes and he had no reason to know that his
brakes were defective until they failed 1 In holding defendant
liable, the Clark court cited Maloney12 as authority for the
principle that the presumption of negligence must be rebutted by
the defendant's showing not only that he exercised reasonable
care in maintaining his brakes, but also that "failure was not
owing to the negligence of any . . . independent contractor
employed by him to inspect or repair the brakes. '43
Since the automobile owner's maintenance of brakes is now
subject to a non-delegable duty, it is probable that California
decisions relying on Maloney will subject his maintenance of
lights," horns43  steering mechanisms 6 and all other parts of
accidents. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS at 40 (1968). In California,
during 1958, there were 90,306 total accidents causing 135,565 injuries and 3,510 deaths
which have risen to 156,356 total accidents causing 233,834 injuries and 4,883 deaths during
1967. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, DEP'T OF HIGHWAY PATROL, REPORT OF FATAL AND
INJURY MOTOR 'VEHICLE TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS 1967 at 12 (1968).
38. In California, the owner or operator of a motor vehicle must show ability to
respond in damages to the amount of $30,000 for personal injuries and $5,000 for
property damage caused in any one accident. CAL. 'VEHICLE CODE § 16430 (West 1959)
as amended (Supp. 1967). Proof of ability to respond in damages as required by
§ 16430 may be satisfied by certificate of insurer, Id. § 16431, by bond, Id. § 16434,
by deposit of money, Id. § 16435 and by proof of self-insurance, Id. § 16436.
39. See BRAINARD, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1961).
40. 69 Adv. Cal. 463, 445 P.2d 517, 71 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1968).
41. Six months prior to the accident the brakes had been overhauled and
approximately five weeks before the accident the brakes were inspected and adjusted by a
service station. Id. at 464, 445 P.2d at 518, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
42. Id. at 465, 445 P.2d at 518, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
43. Id.
44. CAL,. 'VIIIICL CODI- §§ 24250-26119 (West 1960).
45. Id. at § 27000.
46. Id. at § 24002; Brandes v. Rucker-Fuller Desk Co., 102 Cal. App. 221, 282 P.
1009 (1929).
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automobiles47 covered by Vehicle Code safety standards to a non-
delegable duty.
California decisions relying on Maloney may promote a
further expansion of the scope of activities subject to a non-
delegable duty as this would be consistent with the recently
developing trend in California toward greater liability and
compensation. Within the last few months, the California
Supreme Court has further expanded the scope of negligence
liability in Dillion v. Legg5 which eliminated duty limitations on
negligent infliction of emotional distress and Rowland v.
Christian49 which eliminated the duty limitations on landowners
and occupiers. Because of this trend'" and the Maloney decision,
the courts will probably justify extending the scope of non-
delegable duties on the bases of either the highly dangerous
nature of the activity or a special relationship to the public or
both. However, their underlying consideration will be a twofold
analysis of (1) the number of injuries the activity causes and (2)
whether the activity is generally insured thereby enabling
distribution of the costs throughout society.
Recognizing that many legal scholars are dissatisfied with
the present principles of negligence as a means of providing
compensation,51 the California Supreme Court is developing this
trend in Maloney and the other recent cases in an attempt to
provide a more satisfactory system of compensation within the
47. CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§ 24000-27907 (West 1960).
48. 69 Adv. Cal. 766, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968), noted in 47 TEXAS L,
REv. 518 (1969).
49. 69 Adv. Cal. 89, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968), noted in 3 U.S.F. L.
REV. 170 (1969).
50. In Elmore v. American Motors Corporation, 70 Adv. Cal. 615, 451 P.2d 84, 75
Cal. Rptr. 658 (1969), the California Supreme Court found that a defective drive shaft
proximately caused an automobile accident and held American Motors, the automobile
manufacturer, and Maywood Bell, the automobile retailer, liable to the plaintiffs, thus
extending strict liability for the defective products to manufacturers and retailers of
automobiles for the harm proximately caused to bystanders. To protect the bystander, the
California court is reaching into the "deep pocket" of the manufacturer and retailer of
automobiles who may allocate the cost of this protection between themselves throughout
their business transactions. The significance of this decision lies in its extension of the
current trend toward greater tort liability in California and foretells further bystander
protection by imposition of strict liability to all manufacturers and retailers.
51. See A. EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951); R. KEETON &
O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1956); FRANKLIN,
REPLACING THE NEGLIGENCE LOTTERY: COMPENSATION AND SELECTIVE REIMBURSEMENT,
53 V . L. REV. 774 (1967).
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present concept of negligence. It is probable that these cases
foreshadow a substantial legislative change in the law of torts.
Only the legislature can completely deal with this problem by
developing compensation plans which will allow recovery
regardless of fault without placing unreasonable burdens upon
society in the form of insurance premiums5 Maloney illustrates
the need for California to adopt an automobile compensation
plan and such a plan may eventually be implemented for all
types of personal injuries.
RICHARD ALAN BERMAN
52. Among the various alternatives to negligence that have been proposed are: the
Columbia Plan which imposes strict liability and compulsory insurance upon the owner
of an automobile-claims and awards are determined by a special board following
procedures similar to Workman's Compensation; Saskatchewan Automobile Insurance
Act which provides for a state insurance fund for compensation of automobile accident
victims without regard to fault-yearly assessment of every driver and automobile owner
provides the funds for this program; Full Aid Insurance which proposes an insurance
policy clause to compensate automobile accident victims for all expenses within one year
of the injury regardless of the liability of the insured. R. KEaON & O'CONNELL, supra
note 51 at 125-39, 140-47, 165-79.
